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In the Supreme Court of the

State of Utah
ALFRED J. FOWERS,

)

Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
DONALD GURNEY and !RETA F.
GURNEY, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

i

)

CASE
NO. 11,2'73

I

APPELLANrs BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action on a Promissory Note and to For&-

close on a Mortgage on real property given to secure the

Promissory Note.

DISPOSITION IN WWER COURT
'rhe Court rendered judgment on the Note and ordered
the Mortgage foreclosed, but decreed that a deficiency
Judgment would not be granted in this case because Donald Gurney and Ireta F. Gurney, his wife, defendants, had
bE>en dischaTged from this obligation . in bankruptcy.
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REJ.IEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant see~ the reversal of 1Jhe judgment of the
Lower Court against Appellant, Alfred J. Fowers,

"That plaintiff be awarded no deficiency resulting
from the sale because defendants have been disoharged
of this obligation in bankruptcy."
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, Alfred J. Fowe.rs, on the 10th day of Novem·
ber, 1965, filed a Complaint to forclose a Note and Mort·
gage, a copy of the Note and Mortgage being attachd to
the Complaint,. and on the same day filed a Lis Pendens
with the Utah County Recorder's office. [)lonald Gurney
and lreta F. Gurney, his wife, were seived with a S~
on the 18th day of November, 1965.
Plaintiff brought this matter for hearing before the
above entitled Court, the Honorable R. L. Tuckett, Judge,
presiding, on the 14th day of December, 1965. On the
14th day of December, 1965, the Mortgage was ordered
foreclosed and rtJhe Note reduced to judgment. The Find·
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Foreclosure were signed and filed by the Honorable R. L. Tuck·
ett, Judge, on the 23rd day of December, 1965. An Order
of Sale was entered on the 27th day of December, 1965,
and the property was originally Noticed for Sale on the
20th day of Januacy, 1966, but said Notice was cancelled
and the property was thereafter advertised in the Orem
Geneva Times and was posted for sale on rtJhe 10th day of
March, 1966. A Certificate of Sale Was thereafter duly
returned to the Clerk of the Court showing that Alfred J.
Fowera had purchased the property for $17 ,000.00 on March
10, 1966.

!
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Defendant, Donald Gurney, filed for Bankruptcy
March 7, 1967. On March 20, 1967, Donald Gurney and
Ireta F. Gwney, his wife, by and through their counsel,
J. Robert Bullock, moved the Court for an Order declaring the iDeficiency Judgment entered upon the judgment
docKet in the records of this Court on or about March 10,
1%6, in favor of plaintiff and' against defendants in the
amount of $4,554.60 to be of no force and effect and in
any event fully satisfied. 'l1he original motion was suppl~
mented on the 4th day of April, 1966, for the purpose of
showing that the deficiency judgment entered in this action on or about March 10, 1966, was satisfied by an oral
fully executed, compromise agreement of the parties
whereby plaintiff, Alfred J. Fowers, agreed to and did reinstate the original indebtedness if defendants paid plaintiff's court costs and attorney's fees in the amount of
$444.75, which court costs and attorney's fees were paid
to plaintiff by defendants on or about August 26, 1966. The
Motions were supplemented by Affidavits on file herein.
On the 24th day of April, 1967, Alfred J. Fowers filed
an Affidavit disclaiming any agreement but stated that he

was willing to enter into a new contract with the defend-

ants on the same terms and conditions as the original Note
and Mortgage if defendants paid a sufficient amount to
comply with the original terms of the Note and Mortgage.

A trial was had on May 9, 1967. On July 12, 1967,
the Court made a Minute Entry stating:
"The Court finds insufficient evidence to support
an enforceable agreement between the parties which
would affect the operation of the deficiency judgment.
Defendants' motion is therefore denied."
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On July 17, 1967, defendants filed a Motion to make
Findings of Thct and Conclusions of Law and to Amend
the Judgment and Decision.
Plaintiff prepared Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law which the Colll"t reftmi
to sign but filed the ~eon October 17, 1967.
On 1lhe 24th day of October, 1967, the Court entered
Findings of Fact and Conclucions of Law and an Order
based upon its Minute Entry dated October 18, 1967, wherein the Cow-t st.at.eel:

1

"Though the parties, by their affidavits, indicate
a disagreement as to what they discussed and did or
did not agree on in their telephone conversation in
early Maroh, 1966, they each admit rthe conversation
and admit to some type of agreement.

Plaintiff's conduct thereafter would indicate that
defendant's ~on is correct or that plaintiff is estopped to assert otJherwise. See Exhibit 1 (Letter 11·
11-66); Exhibit 3 (copy, Cashier's Oheck); Account·
ing Statement, 12- 13-66, Exhibit to affidavit filed 4·
5-67.
As between the parties, an accord may be reached
varying the terms of a judgment. See 1 A.J.2nd 305,

"Accord and Satisfiaction," section 6. The Court finds
such to have OCCUITed here. Upon the resumption d
payments and payment of attorney's fees by defend·
ant, the note and mortgage were re-instated as betWefn
the parties, and defendant's motion is therefore gran·
ted.''
The Court concluded:
"l.

That the promissory note dated July 2, 1965,

:In the amO\.lllt of $18,0000.00, which is the subject of

the foreclosure action resulting in the deficiency judg·

'
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ment ag~ defendants was, and is, reinstated pursuant to a complete, fully executed agreement of accord and satisfaction between the parties.
2. That when the reinstatement of said promissory note occurred, the deficiency judgment based
thereon entered in the records of said Court on March
10, 1966, became fully satisfied and of no force and
effect, and in any e. ent it became inequitable for the
same to have prospective application.
3. That pursuant to Rule 60 (b) clause (6) d~
fendants are enti Ued to a declaration of the Court that
the deficiency judgment entered on March 10, 1966,
is fully satisfied and or no force and effed."

By the Order the deficiency judgment taken about
March 10, 1966, in the amount of $4,554.60 was declared
satisfied and of no force and effect and the Court a'lllthorized and directed the Clerk of this Court to enter upon the
records of this Court in the above entitled matter a Satisfaction of said Deficiency Judgment.
Defendants failed to pay any sum after having the
Deticic·ncy Judgment set aside and the declaration of :the
Court that the Note and Mortgage was reinstated but d~
fe11dants stayed on the property.
Plaintiff thereafter on December l, 1967, filed an
Amended Complaint Which was considered by this Court.
Defendants Answered said Amended COmplaint admitting
Paragraph one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, and nine,
and as to paragraph eight defendants put plaintiff on his
Proof, but thereaiiter sHpulated that an Affidavit may be
flied as to the amOllllt due and owing and further admit1in~; the necessity of incurring reasonable charges for
sedrching the records but denying the balance of paragraph
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ten and alliSwering paragraph 11 alleging that they are

without sufficient infonnation to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations 1Jhereon, and upon that
basis, denied the same. As a Third Defense defendants,
Donald Gurney and Ireta F. Gurney, his wife, plead:
"As a further and affirmative defense, defendant,
Donald Gurney, alleges that he was duly adjudgad a
bankrupt by the United States District Court for the
District of Utah on a petition filed by him on Maroh
7, 1967, and that the indebtedness sued upon herein
has been duly scheduled for discharge, and will be
discharged in due course.''
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE NOTE AND MORTGAGE WAS REINSTATED
OCTOBER 24; 1967, BY THE ACT OF THE COURT.

When the Decree of Foreclosure W8$ entered in this
matter on December 23, 1965, andi tlhe Note reduced to
Judgment (See Decree of Foreclosure filed December 23,
1965, and Minute Entry of December 14, 1965) I 1Jhe original Promissory Note as discharged and the instrument
thereby extinguished. see lOC.J.S. Bills and Notes Section 472, p. 1025, wherein it is stated:
"If judgment is recovered on a bill or a note, the
instrmnent is thereby extinguished as between plaintiff and defendant;"
Ordinarily the cause of action sued on, the original
Note and Mortgage, merged in the judgment rendered
thereon and may not again be Utigated, this is discussed at
50 C.J.S. Section. 599, p. 20-23, as follows:
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"A claim or demand which is put in suit and pru&.°S
to final judgment is merged or swallowed up in the
judgment; and this rule applies to a final decree in a
court of equity. The judgment extinguishes the original cause of aotion, which loses its vitality and cannot
thereafter be litigated, either as a cause of action or
as a set-off or counterclaim, unless a statute otherwise
provides, and the rights of the parties are governed by
the judgment. Moreover, as a general rule all the peculiar qualities of the claim are merged in the judgment which then stands rn1 the same footing as all
other judgments.
The doctrine of merger has been variously stat.ed
to be based on the principle that a superior right covers or absorbs an inferior right, and that a judgment
is of a higher order of security than an ordinary cause
of action, because it would be vexatious to the one party, and of no benefit to the other, to permit the recovery of two judgments against the same person for one
debt, and that it arises out of the quality of a judgment which renders it conclusive, or because the original matter, which was open to controversy, is definitely settled by the judgment. In order that a cause
of action may be merged in a judgment it must be set
up as a cause of action or as the basis for a judgment,
and judgment must be rendered thereon. If the judgment is valid, the holder's recovery should be on the
judgment, but, if it is invalid, his recovery should be
on the original cause of action.
In general the doctrine of merger applies to all
ca.uses of action, whether ex rontra<...1u or ex delicto,
and al<;o where plaintiff has two or more alternative
remedies for the same wrong and obtains a judgment
with a limited form of relief. It includes CQIJltracts,
bonds, notes, and causes of action on which judgment
is rendered for or against an executor or administra-
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tor, but generally not a judgment om which a new judgment is rerovered, as discussed supra Section 561.
Limitation of doctrine. The doctrine of merger
will not, however, be carried any fw·ther than the ends
of justice require. The judgment docs not annihilate !
the debt..s, destroy its character as evidence, or change
the essential nature and real fmmdation of the cause
of action. It does not preclude all inquiry as to the
character or nature of the original cause of action, or :
an ascertainment of whether or not the claim is rrnlly
one of a nature such as the court is authorized to enforce; and, when the essential rights of tihe parties are
influenced by the original contract, the court will look
behind the judgment for the purpose of ascertaining
what the original contract was.
The judgment only changes the form of action ,
for recovery. The incidrnt of the old debt may be
carried forward to prevent the inequitable destruction
of a right, privilege or exemption. The creditor is not
deprived by the judgment of his right to resort to a
fund, or to avail himself of a lien or 'security held for
the debt. The fact that, as a certain p€TS011S or property, a debt or obligation is merged in a judgment
thereon does not prevent it from remaining an effec·
tive cause of action against other persons or property." ,
The new liability that is created is further discuSSed
at 50 C.J.S., Section 600, p. 24, as follows:
"As a general rule the recovery of a judgment creates a new debt or liability, distinct from the original
claim or demand, and this new liability is not merely
the evidence of the creditor's claim, but is thereafter
the substance of the claim itself."
Until the Court reinstated the Mortgage and set aside

9

the Judgment on October 24, 1967, the obligation was. in
the form of the Judgment. The action of the Court at the
request of defendants created a new obligation October 24,
1967.

Defendants by their Motion dated March 20, 1967, and
filed March 22, 1967, askd for and obtained relief from the
judgment of this Court under Rule 60 (b) Clause (6), see
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed in this matter October 24, 1967. Rule 60 (b) provides:
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party
Gr his legal repr2sentative.s from a final judgment, order, or proceedings for the follorwing reasons . . . the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged,
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been
rev~.csed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have pro.3pective application;"

On the 24th day of October, 1967, the Court concluded:
"2. That when the reinstatement of said promissory note occurred, the deficiency judgment based
thereon entered in the r€'.:nrds of said Court on March
10, 1966, became fully satisfied and of no force and
effect, and in any event it became inequitable for the
same to have prospective application.
3. That pursuant to Rule 60 (b) clause (6) defendants are entitled to a declaration of the Court that
the deficiency judgment entered on March 10, 1966, is
fully satisfied and of no force and effect." (See Conclusions of Law signed on the 24th day of October,
1967)
The Court set aside the deficiency judgment and reinstated the obligation existing between the parties because

10
of an accord and satisfaction.

tober 18, 1967.

See Minute Entry dated Oc-

POINT II
DEFENJDANT, DONALD GURNEY'S, CONDUCT IN
THIS PROCEEDING IS TANTAMOUNT TO ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF TIIE DEBT AND AGREEMENT TO PAY
TIIE SAME.
Defendant has obtained and taken advantage of a delay because of Defendant's affirmative action.
Williston on Contracts revised addition Volume SLx,
Section 1844-1845 d.i,scusses the problem as follows:
"It is clear that the debtor has just reason to complain if .the law allows the creditor to proceed at once
with his original cause of action without giving the
debtor an opportunity to satisfy it as the parties agreed
in the accord. Recognized principles, however, suffice to protect the debtor. His grievance is that the
creditor has broken the promise of temporary forbearance necessarily implied from the accord, and he should
be entitled to the same redress that is allowed for
breach of contracts for temporary forberu•ance where
there is no agreement of accord. A covenant or at:her
contract for temporary forbearance is not a good plea
at law to an action brought in violation of the contract.
if the maxim of the common law is sustained, as it usually has been, that a cause of action once suspended
after it has arisen is permanently gone. Thus, as has
been previously pointed out, an unexecuted agreement
of accord for the settlement at a future day of the
principal's debt has been held not to discharge the sur·
ety, on ·the ground that the accord docs not suspend
the right of action. Some decisions, however, find no
difficulty in allowing the defense at law, and there
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seems no intrinsic reason why the procedure of a court
at law should be inadequate for the pwpose of giving
a temporary suspension of the action. If, however,
the plea is held bad as a legal defense, the facts afford
no better ground for an equitable plea to the action,
since equity would not grant a permanent injt.m.ction
against the creditor's action, and, therefore, the same
difficulty that forbids upholding the plea as a legal
defense is equally insuperable to an equitable defense.
The defendant is entitled to delay not to a defense on
th merits, and, relief not being obtainable at law, he
must apply to a cou:M. of equity powers for a tempo.racy injunction against the prosecution of the action,
and such an injunction should be granted.
In 1Jhe case of an accord there is a further difficulty. It will not greatly help the debtor to get a temporary injunction on the exp~ or implied promise
of the creditor to forbear if 1Jhe creditor is permitted
ultimately to refuse to accept the agreed satisfaction,
and then to enforce his original cause of action. In
order to give effectual relief, therefore, equity must
specifically enforce the performance of the accord. As
a court of law cannot give adequate relief, and as the
Promise of temporary forbearance neceBUily included
in the accord gives equity jurisdiction of the matter,
there seems good reason for equity to deal with the
whole matter by granting specific performance.
Though ,1Jhere is strangely little authority urpon the
matter, and though in the few cases on the point the
reasoning is not very full or satisfactory, the result here advocated seems to be justified by the decisions."

The Restatement of the Law, Contracts, discusses the

Probbm as follows:

"TOPIC 9. DISCHARGE BY ACCORD AND
SATISFACTION.
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Section 417. An Aiecord; Its Effect; When Per.
formed And ,When Broken.
Except as stated in Section 142, 143 with refer.
ence to contracts for the benefit of third persons and
as stated in Section 418, the following rules are appli.
ca.Ible to a contract to accept in the future a stated per.
formance in satisfaction of an existing contractual duty, or a duty to make compensation:
a. Such a contract does not disicharge the duty,
but suspends the right to enforce it as long ~
there has been neither a breach of the contract
nor a justification for the creditor in changing his
position because of its prospective non perform·
ance.
b. If such a contract is performed, the previously
existing duty is discharged.
c. If the debtor breaks such a contraict the creditor has alternative rights. He can enforce either
the original duty or the subsequent contract.
d. If the creditor breaks such a contract, the
debtor's original duty is not discharged. The
The debtor acquired a right of action for damage-.;
for the breach, and if sipecific enforo2ment of that
contract is practicable, he acquired an alternative
right to the specific enforcement thereof. If the
contract is enforced specifically, his original duty
is discharged . . . .
illustrations of

Cla~

(d):

4. A owes B $1000.00. They contract that
in settlement, A shall deliver to B a specific automobile on August 1. Tl1e automobil~ is of an or·
dinary make and a similar one is obtainable vn
the market. A tenders the machine on that da;,
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burt. B refuses to receive it. If B thereafter sues
A for the original debt, A can sue or counterclaim
for the damages suffered by the refusal of B to
accept the machine in satisfaction of his claim;
or A can obtain a decree of specific enforcement
providing for the concurrent delivery of the machine and discharge of the debt.

5. A owes B an unliquidated matured debt.
They contract that as settlement A shall pay B
$100.00 on the first day of August following. A
tenders the money on that day but B refuses to
receive it. If B thereafter sues A for the original debt, A can sue or counterclaim for the damages suffered by B's refusal or A can obtain a decree of specific enforcement, requiring the concurrent payment of $100.00 by A and the discharge
of .fue original debt by B."
The Bankruptcy Act does not provide for the revival
of discharged debts, this~ governed by State Law, which
Wliformly holds that the bar of a discharge may be waived
by a new promise. Collier Bankruptcy Manual, Section
17.13.
Generally it is not necessary that rtlhe new promise 1be
in writing although a written promise is sometimes required
by local statute. Collier Bankruptcy Manual, Section 17.13.

The general rule is that the promise of a bankrupt to
pay the debt in question is binding whether the promise
is made after the filing of the petition and before the discharge, or sUJbsequent to the discharge. Collier Bankruptcy Manual, Section 17.13.
California in a recent case, Davidson, et we., vs. An·
derson, et al., 271 P.2d 233, decided June 9, 1965, had oc-
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casion to examine an acknowledgment of the debt and an
agreement to pay it. The fact situation wa,s as follows:
"The respondent was adjudged a bankrupt on July
26, 1951, and he was granted his discharge in bankruptcy on April 11, 1952. On May 29, 1952, the a~
pellants were granted permission in the bankruptcy
proceeding to institute the present action. This action was commenced on September 10, 1952, by a romplaint for foreclosure wherein the usual relief, including a deficiency judgment, was prayed for by appellants. On October 24, 1952, respondent filed his answer. The answer was, for all practical purposes, a
general denial, the matter of bankruptcy was not being mentioned in it. On February 2, 1953, the ca;;e
was called for trial, and the respondent then stipulated
without re;servation that judgment might be entered
against him. On March 20, 1953, judgment was entered against respondent granting appellants all relief
asked for in the complaint, including the right to seek
a deficiency judgment. A foreclosure sale was then
had in accordance with the judgment, and a return on
the sale was made to the trial court. The appellants
thereafter sought and obtained a deficiency judgment
against the respondent on August 6, 1953. The respondent has notice of all these proceedings, but made
no objection to them prior to filing the proceedings out
of which this appeal grows. On August 20. 1953. respondent filed the instant proceeding seeking his dis·
charge from the judgment under the provisions of Sec·
tion 675b of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the trial
Court granted his motion of February 15, 1964. This
appeal followed."
The Court stated:
"Obviously, the judgment in this case was not discharged by respondent's discharge in bankruptcy, for
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the action upon which it is founded was not commenced until after the respondent had been granted
hi:; discharge in bankruptcy. The sole question, then,
is whether the debt upon which the judgment is founded was discharged, and if so, whether the judgment
itself must therefore fall. The record indicates that
the debt was discharged, but under the peculiar facts
of this case, the respondent can obtain no comfort from
that fact, for he stipulated that judgment might be
entered against him on this debt after he had received
his discharge in bankruptcy. Hlis stipulation that
judgment might be entered against him is tantamount
to an acknowledgment of the debt, and an agreement
to pay it. There was ample consideration for this
new agreement, for even though the remedy to enforce
the debt, discharged by fue proceedings in bankruptcy,
was gone, the moral obligation to pay the debt remained, and constituted sufficient consideration to
support the new promise to pay. Civil Code, Sec 1606;
12 Cal Jur. 2d 235; Lambert v. Sohmalz, 118 Cal. 33,
50 P. 13. Furthermore, a stipulation for a judgment
is a consent to the entry of the judgment and is a waiver of errors by the party consenting thereto. Such
a judgment so entered will not be disturbed on appeal.
Morrow v. Learned, 76 Cal.App 538, 245 P. 442; 13
Cal.Jur. 878 . . . .

... No authority has been called to our attention and

we are unable to find any authority, which holds that

a bankrupt debtor may appear in an action brought
by his creditor on a discharged debt, stipulate for judgment, and then, after the judgment has been entered
on his stipulation, seek relief under the provisions of
Sec. 675b of the Code of Civil Procedure. There are
a host of cases holding that if a debtor fails to affirmatively plead the bar of his discharge in bankruptcy
and the case goes to judgment, he has waived his right
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to that defense. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Lipscomb,
40 Cal.App. 2d 171, 104 P.2d 525; Harrell v. Hoag.
land, 18 Cal. App. 2d 721, 64 P.2d 953; Holmes v. Justice Court, 19 Cal.App. 2d 362, 65 P.2d 820; Tuttle v.
Scott, 119 Cal. 586, 51 P. 849. We do not think the
rule should be otheirwise in situations such as we now
have before us. We think that any bankrupt debtor
who actually appears in an action on a debt claimed
by him to be di,wharged in bankruptcy must plead
that defense in the action, and if he fails to do so, he
waives his right to claim relief under Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 675b. Any other rule would allow the
bankrupt debtor to lure his creditor into the expenditure of needless time, effort and money, to trifle with
the Court, and to needlessly take up time of all con·
cemed, only to have him defeat the claim by the iden·
tical defense that he could have raised long before in
the very same proceeding. This, we believe, would
be a travesty on jl.1$tice and common sense dictates
that it should not be permitted."
CONCLUSION

That there was affirmative relief in this case granted
by the Court on the 24th day of October, 1967, which at
the request of defendants reinstated the Note and Mortgage
which had been previously discharged by the judgment
at the request of the defendants and defendants acknowl·
edged the debt and promised to pay the same.
Defendants' action asking for affirmative relief in set·
ting aside the deficiency judgment and maintaining pos·
session of the real property since December 23, 1965, when
the judgment was originally entered and failing to mention
his bankruptcy in said motion for affirmative relief is tan·
tamount to admowledgment of the debt, and agreement

1
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to pay it. That there was ample oonsideration for this
new agreement, for even though the remedy to enforce the
debt discharged by the proceedings in bankruptcy, W8$
gone, the moral obligation to pay the debt remained and
constituted sufficient consideration to support the new
promise to pay.
Defendants asked for and received as Williston states
it a delay not on a defense on the merits. Defendant's, Donald Gurney's, conduct is tantamount to an acknowledgment
of the debt 'and an agreement to pay it, otherwise, defendant, Donald Gurney, is trifling with tlle Court as stated in
Davidson vs. Anderson, heretofore referred to.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY H. IVIE
Attorney for Plaintiff
48 NortJh University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84601

